

design arguments and replies. Despite these reservations, this work is a great reminder of the value of philosophy of religion in an introductory context: serious discussion of God, evil, and design touches on issues of modal logic, free will and determinism, epistemic justification, and so much more.

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Jerry L. Walls. *Purgatory: The Logic of Total Transformation*. Oxford University Press, 2012.

In a time when most would consider the doctrine of purgatory as problematic and medieval, Jerry L. Walls rehabilitates the doctrine for the purpose of contemporary discussion. As a philosopher in the Protestant and Wesleyan tradition, Walls brings fresh eyes to the doctrine of purgatory that is often associated with Roman Catholicism. In the spirit of C.S. Lewis, Walls offers us a feast of thoughts on purgatory that logically and coherently link salvation and sanctification in this world to glorification in the next. *Purgatory* is also the culmination of a series of works Walls has written on the afterlife with *Hell: The Logic of Damnation* and *Heaven: The Logic of Joy*.

As to the structure of the work, Walls proceeds from the historical, the philosophical, to a contemporary construction of the doctrine of purgatory by drawing from C.S. Lewis on salvation and purgatory. The aim of the book is to assess the logic of the doctrine of purgatory and provide a view that has ecumenical promise not only to Roman Catholics, but to the rest of the Christian tradition – the Orthodox Church and the Protestant Church. In chapter 1, Walls offers a short canvassing of historical views on purgatory. Walls proceeds to look at objections from his tradition in chapter 2. In chapter 3, he offers various models of purgatory, broadly including Satisfaction Models and Sanctification Models. In chapters 4 and 5, he considers the problem of personal identity in purgatory, specifically the notion of stability and change, and the possibility of a ‘second chance’ for those who did not accept the satisfaction offered in Christ. The last two chapters include a constructive proposal of purgatory that is ecumenical in nature and a summing up of findings.

Walls explores the rationale and ground for the vision of God after somatic death. Walls argues that this is non-negotiable in the Christian tradition. We cannot go before God with an unholy character, but we must have a nature that is without sin. This is true if for no other reason than the fact that we cannot see God in all of his holiness without ourselves being holy. There is reason to think that when humans die, specifically those who have been 'redeemed', they are in fact not holy or perfect. If this is true in conjunction with the belief that we, as believers, will see God when we die, then an ensuing dilemma arises. The former precludes the latter. Walls considers four options on the nature of persons in heaven. We may enter the afterlife with imperfections, believers may not ever find their way to God, we may be instantaneously transformed at death or we are cleansed in purgatory prior to entering heaven (p. 6). The last two are the only feasible solutions that Walls considers throughout the book. The manner in which he develops a case in favour of purgatory is worth considering. To this we now turn.

Walls begins his case by establishing the foundation for the discussion in Scripture and in history – this is the first highlight. He makes apparent that the Scriptural case in favour of purgatory is slim, but that the logic is implicit within Scripture that is later teased out by Divines within Christian tradition (p. 13). He also mentions the Scriptural ground for thinking there are differing regions between heaven and hell that establish the possibility for purgatory. One example he cites is from the story of the Rich Man and Lazarus where Lazarus is portrayed as being in hell temporarily and others are temporarily in Abraham's bosom (p. 13). However, this is clearly a teaching that favours the doctrine of the intermediate state between somatic death and physical resurrection. That interim period seems to be a designated period of time and can be readily interpreted as somewhere on the earth that we presently experience. Nonetheless, this does open up a slim possibility that Scripture is not closed to the notion of purgatory, but I must emphasize its *slim possibility*. Later he refers to Divines that support the doctrine of purgatory and further develop the notion – one notable supporter is Augustine. Augustine is noteworthy for influencing the notion of three states in the afterlife that correspond to three kinds of persons in the afterlife. The three categories of persons and states in the afterlife include those who are wicked in hell, those who are not ready for heaven in purgatory, and the blessed in heaven (p. 16).

In this chapter, Walls notes the influential motivations for the development of the doctrine of purgatory and some initial reasons for rejecting it. The rise of the doctrine of purgatory is due to five influences within Church history, which include: social/economic factors, the rise in thinking about morality in terms of proportionality, a growth in thinking about justice, the shift in thinking after the 12th century to the intermediate state and, finally, the general consensus that pain has some desirable effects on moral formation (pp. 20-21). In terms of its rejection, Walls is quick to point out that a dismissal of it is due to its lack of Scriptural support, its abuses in medieval Christianity and its potential undermining of Christ's work on the cross. Walls argues that there may be reason to think that Scripture does not exclude the doctrine of purgatory. He also argues that while it may have been abused this in no way undermines the doctrine as potentially true. The doctrine of Christ's work is taken up in the next chapter.

A second highlight of *Purgatory* is found in chapter 3, the 'Models of Purgatory'. Here, Walls develops two broad categories of thinking about purgatory. This is essential for understanding the rest of his argument in the book. Walls develops what is called the satisfaction model and the sanctification model of purgatory. He argues that a satisfaction model has little to offer by way of establishing a common ground suitable for all sects of Christianity to unite, but that the sanctification model provides us with a suitably robust conception of the doctrine of purgatory that avoids contradicting theological essentials found in Eastern Orthodoxy or Protestantism. The logic of purgatory on the sanctification model is to finish the process of making persons actually holy. This is not to say that the person is not legally justified before God or not acceptable in God's mind, but that he is not *actually* righteous (p. 61). This model, arguably, does nothing to undermine the work of Christ but emphasizes what is often referred to as the 'subjective' aspects of redemption. Another way of looking at this is in terms of perception. There is a sense in which if our characters have not been suitably developed toward a good we will not have a suitable nature to enjoy a particular good. I may know and be committed to the fact that exercise is good for my physical body, but until I have suitably conditioned my body exercise is just painful. Later, it can become pleasurable. In the same way if my character has not been suitably developed, then there is a sense in which seeing God would be painful, potentially far too painful to endure until I have acquired certain virtues (pp. 82-91). This leads us to another highlight of the book

that is also essential to the argument made in favour of purgatory and it concerns the nature and necessity of time.

In chapter 4, 'Personal Identity, Time and Purgatory', Walls lays out some of the problems concerning the metaphysics of personal identity and its relationship to the doctrine of purgatory by considering variations of materialism, Thomism and substance dualism. He argues that all three are not without problems, but can coherently account for the doctrine of purgatory. Next, Walls discusses the necessity of time as a precondition for subjective transformation predicated upon a moral agent's ability to choose between right and wrong moral actions. Walls assumes a libertarian notion of freedom and argues that meaningful freedom requires that individuals have the ability to choose, such that character development is conditioned upon freedom and causally requires it. Assuming this is true, Walls argues that this seems to assume a notion of time in the afterlife. By arguing for the necessity of time for change, Walls draws from Brown and Charles Taylor in support of the intuition that time is necessary for the development of individual identity (p. 116).

With all that is positive about the reasons a traditional Christian ought to accept the doctrine of purgatory, I am convinced that Walls has not been attentive enough to the intricacies of the Reformed view or a variation within Reformed thought on the afterlife as an adequate alternative to purgatory. In chapter 2, Walls discusses various protestant objections to purgatory from a Lutheran perspective, a Reformed perspective and a Wesleyan perspective. Here I am specifically interested in his treatment of the Reformed perspective and why he may not have given it sufficient attention. In his treatment of Reformed perspectives, Walls relates Reformation teaching to Lutheran teaching in that sanctification is a process of individual mortification of the 'flesh' or that nature that was 'fallen in Adam' and is disposed toward immorality (p. 42). This notion is often referred to as 'progressive sanctification', such that, after being justified on the basis of Christ's atoning work on the cross, the person will over time become holy and weaken the 'flesh' nature and its habits. On page 43, Walls quotes from the Westminster Confession of Faith as support for the notion that after death the 'righteous' persons or persons who have been justified in Christ will be made perfect and will see God prior to the resurrection of the body. This is the 'instantaneous' view referred to earlier whereby God makes the saint perfect upon death. In addition to this, Walls, in the context of discussing Edwards' view, points out what is common to many Reformation views that the body

still has remnants of sin. Throughout this chapter, he portrays this view as 'ad hoc' and degrading to the body (see especially page 45). I wish to respond by saying that I do not think Walls has adequately grasped the Reformed view or at least some variations of it. It seems to me that what many Reformed thinkers have argued for is the notion that at justification there is a subjective transformation or a transformation of the soul likened to the physical resurrection of the body. The soul that has been justified, you might say, has received new 'relations' and new capacities that are disposed toward holiness and perfection. At this moment, the individual who has been redeemed struggles, primarily with the physical correlate of his/her human nature. This does not mean that the body is intrinsically bad or that Gnosticism is being affirmed, as Walls has argued (p. 45). It simply means that the soul has no positive disposition toward evil, but the effects of sin and corruption that are passively received in the body remain – hence the need for physical resurrection. The effects of sin and corruption somehow reside in the body (see Romans 6; see John Calvin, John Murray and Robert Reymond on the matter). This is not to denigrate the body for the soul was in the same position prior to justification and redemption. This pattern is not limited to this situation, either, but is reflected throughout Scriptural teaching on persons. There is always a logical, if not temporal, priority of sin in the soul then the body – assuming substance dualism. Arguably, the individual soul sinned then the body received the effects of sin and corruption. In the same order, the soul receives redemption, then the body as seen in salvation and, finally, physical resurrection.

It seems to me this can undermine the supposed 'ad hoc' nature of an instantaneous perfection. It also may not be accurate to define it as instantaneous for it begins when the person makes a decisive break with his old life and culminates in the afterlife and the completion of human nature at the physical resurrection. Let me make two comments to support this. First, the soul that is cleansed and now righteous is not merely righteous in some judicial sense, but is righteous in some 'real' sense. There is a radical decisive break with the old nature and a new nature that is united to God that is accompanied by new accoutrements directed toward perfection, which follows justification. This does mean that the soul is able to enter into heaven and see God while disembodied. Furthermore, this does not undermine the fact that it generally takes a great deal of time to change our character states. The reality is that some events in life have a greater effect on individuals than the effect of

other events. Additionally, some events that are conditional upon the will set a chain reaction for other changes, which is what I am suggesting concerning this variation of Reformation teaching. Second, one could think of this as some new teleological mechanism that helps bring the soul to fruition after somatic death that is made complete upon the physical resurrection. Additionally, this undermines the objection that the reformed view denigrates the body because it requires the body for the completion of human nature and the completion of redemption. Whilst I and other Protestants may not be opposed in principle and may find much of what Walls argues in favour of Purgatory to be sensible, there is cause for doubt. This doubt is motivated not only by Scripture's silence on the matter and a general disdain toward it within the Protestant tradition but also the fact that there is another solution that is rational and coherent to affirm. Another comment is in order concerning a Reformed inclination to affirm a compatibilistic view of freedom. I do not see why someone in the Protestant-Reformed tradition could hold something similar to what is outlined above on a libertarian view of freedom.

On a more speculative note, while humans who have been redeemed are holy, righteous and perfect it may also be the case that humans continue growing in righteousness and perfection. This would seem to allow for degrees, which correspond to degrees in heaven that are, arguably, spoken of in Scripture (see 2 Corinthians 12) or degrees of seeing and experiencing God that correspond metaphysically to our natures. This may assume that 'time' is real in the afterlife and that human persons are not simply passive recipients, but human persons who are actually involved in the whole process of redemption.

It seems Walls has made a good philosophical case for purgatory that is consistent with the core teachings of Eastern Orthodoxy and Protestantism. Having said this, there is still reason to affirm an immediate-glorification-at-somatic-death view as biblically viable and intellectually respectable. In the end, the doctrine of purgatory is rationally acceptable and logically consistent, but it is not the only option in town.